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Abstract 
Multi-agent systems become more and more popular due to successful implementations in different fields. However, there is a 
number of threats that can compromise security of the agent and jeopardize systems security. Therefore, security issues should be 
taken into consideration during development of multi-agent systems. However, different existing methodologies that provide 
guidelines and models for development of multi-agent systems omit security. Therefore, there is a great need in offering security 
solutions which are integrated with system functionalities. This research presents a model for securing multi-agent systems,
which is developed, based on the concepts and models regarding agent’s role and communications. Moreover, possible attacks on 
multi-agent systems are presented and threats are categorized. Furthermore, general security requirements at the agent and the 
system levels are defined and considered in the proposed model.
   
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of KES International. 
Keywords: Multi-agent system security; Threats, attacks and vulnerabilities; agent-oriented programming; security requirements. 
1. Introduction 
Agent-oriented programing (AOP) is a relatively new paradigm that introduces concepts based on artificial 
intelligence in distributed system [1]. In a system based on AOP the basic component is agent. Agent-based systems 
have been widely used in open distributed environments such as e-commerce, mobile computing, network 
management and information retrieval [9]. Agent-based systems consist of more than one agent and called a multi-
agent system (MAS). Such systems can be complex and used for example for decision support. The more complex a 
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system is the more difficult is to control it and consequently predict its behaviour [11]. 
During the past years there have been many research works about AOP [5]. Various agent-oriented software 
engineering methodologies, such as Gaia, offer different approaches in modelling MAS [ibid.]. However, there have 
only been a few attempts made to “integrate security issues within the development stages of methodologies” [ibid.].
Cybercrimes are costly both for the businesses and their customers. Criminals with different purposes not only cause 
financial loss but also ruin organizations’ reputations and images. In order to prevent cybercrimes, security issues 
should be considered early in a development process [10]. Security in multi-agent systems is not fully addressed to 
the authors’ best knowledge. The use of multi-agent systems for security monitoring, control and management is 
increasing due to growing complexity of distributed systems. Therefore, it is essential to consider security issues of 
multi-agent systems. 
2. Related work 
During the past years many attempts have been made to identify and to solve the security issues in MAS.  
Wong et al. [16] have identified the following security vulnerabilities in MAS: corrupted naming and 
matchmaking services, insecure communication channels, insecure delegation of services and lack of 
accountabilities. The authors propose to solve the above mentioned vulnerabilities by adding security and trust to 
MAS. According to Wong et al. [16] it can be achieved by using the following methods: to use reliable agent name 
servers; to provide a unique identifier to every agent and to offer every agent the ability to prove the identity; to 
protect the communication channels; to make agent prove that they are delegates of whom they claim to be and to 
make deployers of agents liable for the actions of their agents [ibid.].
Borselius [4] have also identified security issues in MAS, but with the authors use a different approach: the 
identified security issues are based on the characters of agents and MAS. The identified characters are situatedness, 
autonomy, flexibility (responsive, pro-active and social), mobility, rationality, veracity and benevelence [ibid.]. 
Some of the security issues identified by Borselius et al. [4] are as follows: delegation of services; communication 
security issues regarding identification and authentication; protection of agents from their hosts and protection of 
hosts from the agents. The researchers [4] propose a public key infrastructure as the solution to the security issues 
related to delegation of services and communication. Regarding the security of hosts a sand-box concept is proposed 
as a solution [ibid.]. Borselius et al. [4] have drawn a conclusion that there is no single solution to the security 
problems introduced by mobile agents unless there is a trusted hardware.  
Moradian [10] has proposed a model to increase security in MAS. The proposed model is based on Gaia 
methodology and consists of different modules: interface, authentication module, search module and match and 
check module. The author [10] proposes meta-model with the two types of agents, i.e. meta-agents who operate at 
macro-level and ground level software agents that operate at micro-level. Meta-agents can have the following roles: 
InterfaceAgent, AuthenticateAgent, CoordinationAgent, ControlAgent and MatchAgent [ibid.]. A ground level 
software agent has a role as SearchAgent. The user in MAS is defined as a human agent and an InterfaceAgent 
works as interface to the human agents [10].
3. Gaia methodology and multi-agent systems 
An agent is a software entity that is situated in some environment and is capable of flexible, autonomous action in 
order to meet its design objectives [8]. Bellifenine et al. [1] defines an agent as “a special software component that 
has autonomy that provides an interoperable interface to an arbitrary system and/or behaves like a human agent, 
working for some clients in pursuit of its own agenda”. An agent can play one or more roles and interact with other 
agent to exchange knowledge and coordinate their activities. These interactions occur according to patterns and 
protocols dictated by the nature of the role itself [18]. 
Gaia methodology was developed for agent-oriented analysis and design. The methodology consists of two 
phases - the analysis phase and the design phase [17]. According to Gaia methodology an organizational model 
consists of two models, i.e. the roles model and the interaction model [ibid]. Both models are the result of the 
analysis phase. The roles model is used to identify all the key roles in the system under development and the 
interaction model represents the relations between different roles in the system under development. In every system 
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there are different types of roles which can be viewed as “an abstract description of an entity’s expected function
[ibid]. Each role has four attributes: responsibility, permissions, activities and protocols. There are two types of 
responsibilities: i.e. liveness, which states that something good will happen and safety which states that nothing bad 
will happen during the execution. Permissions, i.e. the rights associated with each role,”identify the resources that 
are available to that role in order to realize its responsibilities”. ”The activities of a role are computation associated 
with the role that may be carried out by the agent without interacting with other agents” [ibid].  Protocols in Gaia 
methodology define the way how a role can interact with other roles.  The interaction model consists of a set of 
protocols and represents the relations between different roles in the organization. During the design process Gaia 
methodology focuses on how the agents in the society cooperate with each other in order to achieve the goals on the 
system level and what each agent needs to contribute to achieve the system goals [17].  The purpose of a Gaia 
design process is to generate three models: the agent model, the service model and the acquaintance model [ibid].
The agent model identifies the agent types and the agent instances of the identified types. The service model 
identifies the main services required to realize the agents’ role. The acquaintance model documents the 
communications between agents [17].  
Gaia methodology is one the recognized design and analysis methodologies to develop MAS. The basic concept 
of Gaia methodology is to “think of an agent-based system as an artificial society or organization [15, 17]. The 
system developers are encouraged to consider the process of developing MAS as a design process of an organization 
[17]. Gaia methodology is logic and useful, it covers the design and analysis of the functionalities of a system and 
invariants for the defined functionalities [17]. According to Gaia methodology there are clearly described definitions 
of the roles that agents possess. Agents’ rights and communications among agents are also well defined by using 
protocols. However, Gaia methodology lack of support in software engineering principle and does not support 
stages other than the analysis and design stages [13].  Moreover, the design and analysis of security issues is omitted 
in the methodology. Therefore, multi-agent systems are vulnerable to a number of threats. Thus, there is a great need 
in security solutions, which are integrated with system functionalities. 
4. Security issues and attacks on agent in multi-agent systems 
 Many researchers have during the past years identified two important issues regarding developing secure 
systems, i.e. that developers lack  education in software security and that the design of system security is separated 
from the design and implementation of the system functionalities [12, 14]. Therefore, security should be 
incorporated in the design and analysis phase during the development of MAS. The foundation of information and 
IT-security is confidentiality, integrity, and availability [3]. In order to be able to build secure MASs that can to a 
certain degree guarantee confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information in the system, developers need 
a security design model as support already during the design and analysis phase.  
Nowadays agent technologies are used in information and communication systems in order to provide services 
such as management, search and monitoring [10]. Different kinds of agent-oriented methodologies have been 
developed during the past years. Gaia methodology is one of them. The problem is that Gaia methodology doesn’t 
provide any security models consisting of generally applicable security solutions, neither at the system level nor at 
the agent level.  
The main goal of security is to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information assets 
and resources that the software creates, stores, processes, or transmits [7]. Security issues are not considered in Gaia 
methodology and security goals are not satisfied since security is not incorporated in design and analysis phase 
during development of multi-agent systems. Consequently, such systems contain vulnerabilities and are not resistant 
for attacks [10]. 
Security issues including possible attacks on agents and MAS were identified by different researches [16, 6, 4, 9, 
2]. Problem regarding agent authentication and authorization were elucidated by Cremonini et al. [6]. The later 
problem but also problems with protection of agents from their hosts and vice versa were also alerted by Borselius et
al. [4]. Jung et al. [9] point out a number of security problems, such as verification of information that agents collect 
from Internet, unauthorized access to agents, intrusions to MAS caused by agents, insecure communications among 
agents as well as between agents and humans, attacks from mobile agents to their hosts and attacks from hosts to the 
mobile agents, attacks on agents from malicious agents, attacks from users. Moreover, Jung [9] just like Broselius 
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[4] emphasizes the issue regarding agent authentication and authorization. Additionally, a number of attacks on 
mobile agent systems such as event-triggered attacks, disclosure and modification attacks, and DoS attacks were 
identified by researchers [9, 2].
5. Threat categorization and security requirements for multi-agent system 
5.1 Threats categories in multi-agent system 
In order to get an overview of all the identified security issues and possible attacks on MAS the identified issues 
and attacks are categorized into two categories: threats at system level and threats at agent level (See Table 1). By 
threats at agent level means the threats that can be eliminated or get better protection against by adding properties to 
agents. By threats at system level means the threats that can only be eliminated by adding higher level system 
functionalities. Some of the identified threats must be dealt with at both levels.  
Table1. Threats categories. 
Categories Security threats
Threats at 
the system 
level
Threats from mobile agents to hosts Delegation of services
Threats from the Internet: DoS
attack, damage attack, event-
triggered attack, compound attack, 
user attack.
Insecure communication channels
Altering the event logging system of 
a MAS
Insecure agent delegation
Altering the agent code, data and 
configuration
Lack of  accountabilities
Fake agent Agent authorization
Fake service Reputation attack
Threats at 
agent level
Threats from hosts to agents Agent authentication
Threats from agents to agents Verification of information that 
agents collect from the Internet
Threats to communication among agents: identification and authentication, 
unauthorized access to agents, ontology attack, active probing attack, 
message injection, knowledge injection, modification of agents’ interaction 
by altering the transferring information, fake message
Threats from users to agents
Threats at system level addressed in this research are: corrupted mobile agents attack the main system host, fake 
agent, and insecure communication among the platforms. 
The following agent level threats are taken into consideration: agent authentication, fake message, modification 
of agents’ interaction by altering the transferring information, message injection, and unauthorized access to agents. 
5.2 Security requirements for multi-agent system 
To solve minimize security threats and resolve some security issues in multi-agent system following 
requirements have been defined. The defined general requirements at agent level are:
x To make agent identification and authentication more secure  
x To make communication among agents more secure 
x To prevent unauthorized access to agents 
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The defined general requirements at agent level are:  
x To protect the main host system against the threats from the Internet 
x To provide safer communication between different platforms in the system 
x To protect the main host system against mobile agents 
x To provide capacity to isolate part of the system at emergency 
6. Security in multi-agent systems 
There is no such a thing as 100% security and it is not possible to stop or predict all the future cyber-attacks. 
However, if a multi-agent system is robust and security issues and threats are considered during development, it will 
certainly be more secure. Hence, a chance to discover an attack and recover after a serious attack is more likely to 
increase. Based on defined security requirements the following solution is proposed. See Table 2. 
Table 2. Proposed solutions. 
Level Requirements Proposed solution Notes/Comments
At agent 
level 
To make agent identification 
and authentication more secure
An ID-code which consists of the host 
name, code for the agent’s 
permissions and agent name is 
proposed as agent identification and 
authentication. The proposed ID-code 
is included in the header of the 
messages in order to make 
communications more secure and to 
prevent unauthorized access to agents.
The proposed 
formatting of agent ID-
code is illustrated in 
FigureTo make communication 
among agents more secure
To prevent unauthorized access 
to agents
At system 
level
To protect the main host system 
against the threats from the 
Internet
GateAgent with four primary roles: to 
handle all the communications 
between the main host system and 
other components; to monitor the 
communication flows between the 
main host system and other 
components; to break the 
communication channel between the 
main host system and other 
components at emergency; to keep 
mobile agents out of the main host 
system.  
The proposed solution 
is illustrated in Figure
To provide safer 
communication among 
different platforms or 
components in the system
To protect the main host system 
against mobile agents
To provide capacity to isolate 
part of the system at emergency
Communications among agents are one of the most important parts of MAS based on Gaia methodology since 
agents achieve their goals and cooperate with each other through communications. One of the key issues regarding a 
secure communication among the agents is to ensure the agents are what they claim to be. In order to make sure that 
the agent in contact is what it claims to be it is useful to give every agent a unique identifier. However, it is not 
enough to guarantee that an agent with the right name will behave like it is supposed to do. Agent authentication is 
not only about agent identification. It’s also about the agent’s correct behaviours.  
In order to make agent identification and authentication more secure a special formatted ID-code that consists of
the host name, code for the agent’s permissions and agent name is proposed and illustrated in Figure 1. To assure 
that the right agent does the right things the proposed unique agent ID-code can to a certain degree provide more 
secure communication, i.e. add an additional level of security. Furthermore, if a fake agent would be sent to corrupt 
the system by e.g. sending fake messages it will be revealed since the ID-code will not match the formatting or that 
the fake agent’s permissions doesn’t show in the header of the messages. For the same reason it will also prevent 
unauthorized access to agents. For the agent situated in the main system host there is a special permission for that 
purpose so that eventual intruding foreign agents will be revealed as soon as they try to send messages to corrupt the 
main system. By other words, only agents with a unique agent ID-code are allowed to enter the system. 
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The ID-code is included in the header of a message. The receiver agent can check if the sender agent has the right 
to send the specific type of message before it starts to process the message. Thus, the communications among agents 
will be more secure. A fake agent can also be revealed if the fake agent tries to access unauthorized information or 
to send fake messages, which are out of the range of its permissions.  
Fig. 1. Agent ID-code
The behaviours of the agents in an open distributed system can in a certain sense be compared with the real 
people in the real world. An agent can have its own interests and purposes, which differ from those of the system.
An agent can also be affected and altered by the forces outside the system or within the system that the agents 
operate in. All these potential threats can lead to an agent’s misbehaviour. There are many issues regarding agents’ 
behaviour and communications among the agents in MAS. The amount of the security issues increases radically if 
the agents go mobile and “travel” between different platforms and hosts. The proposed solution to secure the system 
against the potential threats from mobile agents and the Internet is illustrated in Figure 2.
In an open distributed MAS based on Gaia methodology every agent has at least one role, i.e. the function in 
form of a task. There is one particular role that each open distributed system has: an agent who collects information 
from a host or a user in the network. In our system that agent is the InternetSearchAgent. Since the only goal an 
InternetSearchAgent is to collect information and to forward the collected information to the main host system 
(MainSystemHost) for further processing there is no need for an InternetSearchAgent to have direct connection with 
the main host system. The interaction is illustrated in Figure 2.  
Every connection or communication in a real world scenario means a potential risk since there is a risk that an 
InternetSearchAgent is attacked by its host, a user or other malicious tools. Thus, the GateAgent is proposed as a 
solution to increase communications security between the MainSystemHost with different components in the system 
and the Internet. Another component which all software system has is a database, which is illustrated as Knowledge 
Base in Figure 2. GateAgent guards the MainSystemHost where the knowledge database lies.  
In order to secure the access and the integrity of Knowledge Base another security precaution is taken, namely 
one more mechanism to separate it from the direct access from the Internet: here in form of 
InformationProcessingAgent.
The preliminary goal of InforationProcessingAgent is to process the forwarded information from the GateAgent
and to push the processed information to KnowledgeBase.  InforationProcessingAgent also provides a layer of 
protection for the Knowledge Base.
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Fig. 2. The proposed solution to guard against mobile agents and the Internet 
. There is certainly a great need to protect the main host system against the potential malicious attempts, which 
are proven to exist. The reason behind the proposed model is to eliminate unnecessary direct communication in 
order to achieve higher security. In other words, any direct communication between the main host system and agents 
situated in other platforms are not permitted unless it is absolutely necessary. GateAgent is functioning like a guard 
for MainSystemHost. 
The other proposed role for GateAgent is to monitor the communication flows between MainSystemHost and 
other platforms and components. The purpose with the GateAgent is to break the communication channel between a 
platform and MainSystemHost It can improve the system security in the way that abnormally high incoming 
messages, caused by e.g. DoS-attack, will be discovered in real time. Therefore, the system has both proactive and 
reactive protections to possible intrusions.  
A possible way to implement the role is to keep track of the amount of requests sent from every platform to 
MainSystemHost. The roles model according to Gaia methodology consists of all the key roles in the system. A role 
model is also comprised of role schemas [17].
The schemas for the proposed primary roles of GateAgent are CommunicationHandler,
CommunicationFlowMonitor, CommunicationChannelHander and MobileAgentIntrusionDetector. Role schema for 
CommunicationHandler is presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Role schema for CommunicationHandler. 
Role schema CommunicationHandler
Description This role involves handling all the communications between 
MainHostSystem and other components of MAS.
Protocols and activities Receive incoming messages, Check agent identity, Check 
agent permissions, Send confirmation message to 
InternetSearchAgent, Initial new messages to 
InformationProcessAgent
Permissions Reads Agent ID-code, messages
Sends Messages to InformationProcessAgent
Responsibilities Liveness CommunicationHandler = (Receive incoming messages, 
Check agent identity, Check agent permissions, Send 
confirmation message to InternetSearchAgent)
Safety incomingMessageProcessed = true
Role schema for CommunicationChannelHandler is illustrated in Table 4. 
Table 4. Role schema for CommunicationChannelHandler. 
Role schema CommunicationChannelHandler
Description This role involves breaking the communication channel 
between MainHostSystem and a platform or a component.
Protocols and activities Check the communication flow status from a platform or a 
component, Break the communication channel, Restore the 
communication channel
Permissions Access CommunicationFlowMonitor
Compares Communication flows
Breaks Communication channel
Restores Communication channel
Responsibilities Liveness CommunicationChannelHander = (Check the 
communication flow status from a platform or a component)
Safety communicationFlowIsChecked = true; communicationFlow < 
normalCommunicationFlow
Role schema for MobileAgentIntrusionDetector is demonstrated in Table 5.
Table 5. Role schema for MobileAgentIntrusionDetector. 
Role schema MobileAgentIntrusionDetector
Description This role involves detecting a intruding mobile agent.
Protocols and activities To compare the incoming messages to a pattern, To alert the 
type of message aiming to transfer a mobile agent to 
MainHostSystem.
Permissions Compares The incoming message with a pattern
Alerts The system about a intrusion
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Responsibilities Liveness MobileAgentIntrusionDetector = (To compare the incoming 
messages to a pattern)
Safety incomingMessageIsChecked = true;
7. Conclusions and future work 
This research presented a model for securing multi-agent systems, which is developed, based on the concepts and 
models regarding agent’s role and communications. The model provides an efficient way to assure that security 
requirements and design are integrated with system functionalities during the development process. Moreover, 
possible attacks on multi-agent systems are presented and threats are categorized. Certain general security 
requirements at the agent and the system levels are defined and considered in the proposed model. The research has 
taken into consideration and addressed a system level threats, such as corrupted mobile agents attack the main 
system host, fake agent, and insecure communication among the platforms as well as the agent level threats, i.e. 
agent authentication, fake message, modification of agents’ interaction by altering the transferring information, 
message injection, and unauthorized access to agents.
This research work is an attempt to extend Gaia methodology with the security model. In order to be able to 
provide developers with a whole scaled model consisting of comprehensive, generally applicable security solutions 
for MAS based on Gaia methodology further research work is needed. 
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